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Resolving the Trade and Environment Conflict:
The WTO and NGO Consultative Relations
William M. Reichert
The World Trade Organization (WTO),' as successor to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),2 recognized
the need for environmentally responsible free trade.3 Achieving
this will be difficult, however, as there are many obstacles to
overcome, both in international law, as well as in the WTO it-
self. Fortunately the WTO has also allowed for the establish-
ment of consultative relations with non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).4 NGOs have made important contribu-
tions to other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) through
consultative relations and have been especially effective in the
environmental field.
This Note argues that the WTO can best pursue free trade
in accordance with principles of sustainable development
through consultative relations with NGOs. Part I discusses the
obstacles facing the WTO in its pursuit of sustainable develop-
ment. Part II considers the nature and contributions of NGOs
and the various models of consultative relations. Part III ex-
plains why the WTO is the best international forum to address
sustainable development, and why NGO consultative status is
crucial for the pursuit of sustainable development. Part III also
addresses specific ways NGOs can effectively contribute to the
1. The WTO is a creation of the Uruguay Round negotiations, becoming
the new framework to conduct trade relations. See General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Document MTN/FA, Part II,
pages 1-14, of December 15, 1993; reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 5
(1995); 33 I.L.M. 13 [hereinafter WTO Charter].
2. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
GATT].
3. WTO Charter, supra note 1, at pmbl. The WTO recognized the need for
free trade that is in accordance with the principles of sustainable development.
4. Article V.2 of the Charter reads: "The General Council may make ap-
propriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmen-
tal organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO." WTO
Charter, supra note 1, at art. V.2.
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process. This note concludes that NGOs are invaluable in recon-
ciling the trade and environment conflict.
I. OBSTACLES TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment in Rio de Janeiro5 connected environmental protection and
economic growth by emphasizing sustainable development. 6
Recognizing this trend, the WTO has noted the importance of
the conference's Declaration on Environment and Development 7
and has pledged to pursue a course of liberalized trade that al-
lows for sustainable development.8 The WTO must overcome
several obstacles, however, to achieve this goal.
A. OBSTACLES INHERENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
1. Divergent Perspectives
Advocates of free trade and advocates of the environment
often view one another with suspicion and hostility.9 The con-
5. For a brief description of the documents that came out of the confer-
ence, see Edith Brown Weiss, Introductory Note, 31 I.L.M. 814, 814-17 (1992).
The texts of the documents may be found at 31 I.L.M. 874.
6. Sustainable development has been defined as "development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs." WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOP-
MENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1991). "At a minimum, sustainable develop-
ment discourages the use of nonrenewable resources and activities that
adversely affect the quality of life for future generations." Kyle E. McSlarrow,
International Trade and the Environment: Building a Framework for Conflict
Resolution, 21 ENvTL L. REP. 10,589, 10,590 (1991).
7. Decision on Trade and Environment, Document MTN.TNC/MIN(94)/lI
REV.1, reprinted in World Trade Organization, The Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 469 (1995), noting Declaration of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992).
8. In the preamble to the WTO Charter, the parties to the agreement
recognize:
[Tihat their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensur-
ing full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and
trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the
world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable devel-
opment, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their re-
spective needs and concerns at different levels of economic
development.
WTO Charter, supra note 1, at pmbl (emphasis added).
9. Environmentalists took an early stance that the GATT and the envi-
ronment were fundamentally opposed to one another. See Michael B. Smith,
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flict appears to be rooted in the opposing philosophies behind
each side's policies. 10 International trade advocates seek to free
commerce from any type of barrier that might restrict the free
flow of goods. Environmentalists seek to conserve the earth's
natural resources and prevent exploitation of the ecosystem,"
often through restrictions that free traders condemn. The differ-
ences between these outlooks are made greater by the fact that
free trade and environmental advocates are generally specialists
in their respective fields, and may not have an adequate under-
standing of each other's agenda. 12
Another cause of the conflict is that the two sides' "emphasis
on domestic versus international issues is inverted. The trade
perspective, while international in context, focuses primarily on
the effect of domestic legislation. The environmental perspec-
tive, by contrast, has primarily a domestic agenda, but focuses
on the effects of international agreements among nations."13
2. International Law
Because environmental hazards do not respect artificial
political boundaries, domestic legislation often cannot effectively
address them.' 4 Unfortunately, the international legal system
is also inadequately suited to solve environmental problems.' 5
Many critics feel that this is due to the emphasis on state sover-
eignty in international law, which guarantees states the right to
develop their natural resources' 6 and often allows a state to in-
GATT, Trade and the Environment, 23 ENVTL. L. 533 (1993). "Many environ-
mental organizations have been critical of the GATT as an agreement and as an
institution. They believe that the GATT views ecosystem protection as a net-
tlesome non-tariff barrier instead of an overriding goal." Steve Charnovitz, Ex-
ploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, J. WORLD TRADE,
Oct. 1991, at 37, 37.
10. McSlarrow, supra note 6, at 10,590.
11. Kurt C. Hofgard, Is This Land Really Our Land?: Impacts of Free
Trade Agreements on U.S. Environmental Protection, 23 ENVTL L. 635, 669
(1993).
12. Kyle E. McSlarrow, It's a Matter of Perspective, in, Making the GATT
Environmentally Correct, ENV'rL. F., July/Aug. 1992, at 22, 27.
13. McSlarrow, supra note 6, at 10,590.
14. Maria Garner, Transnational Alignment of Nongovernmental Organi-
zations for Global Environmental Action, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1057, 1061
(1991).
15. David Scott Rubinton, Toward a Recognition of the Rights of Non-
States in International Environmental Law, 9 PACE ENVrL L. REV. 475, 478
(1992).
16. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
art. 193, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245 (recogniz-
ing the right of every state to develop its natural water resources); Interim-
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flict injury upon the environment with virtually no fear of
reprisal. 17
The 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in
the Soviet Union dramatically illustrated this gap in interna-
tional law. The accident had a profound effect on millions of peo-
ple and affected the citizens, property and environment of at
least twenty countries.18 Despite the fact that customary inter-
national law provides for strict liability for ultrahazardous activ-
ities, 19 "not a single successful claim [was] brought against the
USSR, and this despite the USSR's implied acceptance of its
own negligence in the incident."20 Even if it were easier to
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2,
para. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 (encouraging nations to maximize the use of their
resources to increase the quality of life); Declaration on the Right to Develop-
ment, Feb. 23, 1987, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. No. 53, art.
1, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/41/925 (1986) (declaring the right to development ina-
lienable); General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natu-
ral Resources, Dec. 14, 1962, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., para. 1(1),
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1963).
17. Garner, supra note 14, at 1062. The principles of national sovereignty
and freedom of the seas permit a state to "degrade its own territory... [and] to
inflict injury on areas of the planet lying outside national territory virtually
without limit" subject only to fragmented and primitive rules of international
responsibility. Post-Stockholm: Influencing National Environmental Law and
Practice Through International Law and Policy, 66 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 1, 9
(1972) (statement of John Lawrence Hargrove).
18. Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and International
Law, 30 HARV. INT'L L. J. 393, 402 (1989).
19. See Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting
from Exploration and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, Dec. 17, 1976,
art. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1450 (1977); Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, art. 2, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, 189; Interna-
tional Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969,
art. 3, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, 5; Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Dam-
age, May 21, 1963, art. IV, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265; Claims Against the U.S.S.R. for
Damage Caused by Soviet Cosmos 954 (Canada v. U.S.S.R), Jan. 23, 1979, 18
I.L.M. 899, 907 (stating that the principle of strict liability applies to activities
sharing a high degree of risk); see also Gunther Handl, State Liability for Acci-
dental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private Persons, 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 525, 558 (1980) (concluding that state liability for transboundary pollu-
tion derives from the presumption of state control over the injurious activity).
20. Sands, supra note 18, at 411. "The USSR is not a party to any of the
international conventions relating to third party liability in nuclear energy, and
is therefore not subject to any specific treaty obligation to compensate for dam-
age caused outside its national boundaries." Id. at 407. See also Jillian Barron,
After Chernobyl: Liability for Nuclear Accidents Under International Law, 25
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 647, 648 (1987) (stating that the Soviet Union admit-
ted error, but denied any legal obligation). Sweden and Switzerland publicly
denied the existence of an international legal basis for securing damages from
the U.S.S.R. Gunther Handl et al., International Responsibility for Manmade
Disasters, 81 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 320, 331 (Apr. 8-11, 1987).
222 [Vol. 5:219
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bring a claim under international law, states often do not liti-
gate the international rights of their citizens. 21 A state's inter-
est in not exposing itself to future retributive claims frequently
prevails over the international community's interest in enforc-
ing liability on the responsible state.22
Another reason the international system has difficulty re-
sponding to environmental concerns is that the negotiating pro-
cess is not open to non-state actors. "[O]ur leaders negotiate
treaties and participate in conventions while the rest of us are
left with little more than the ability to watch the continuing de-
terioration of our environment from the sidelines."23 In con-
trast, U.S. legislation such as the Administrative Procedure
Act 2 4 and the Freedom of Information Act 25 ensures more ac-
countability than the often intractable multilateral organiza-
tions.26  "Disclosure and transparency are essential to
promoting a better development process."27 Limiting interna-
tional legal standing to states is incompatible with the modern
world. "The various developments since the two World Wars no
longer countenance the view that, as a matter of positive law,
States are the only subjects of International Law .... [Tihere
must be an increasing disposition to treat individuals, within a
limited sphere, as subjects of International Law."28
21. Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611, 613 (1994).
22. Sands, supra note 18, at 407.
23. Rubinton, supra note 15, at 476 (citations omitted). This is due partly
to the fact that non-state actors (people, corporations, non-governmental orga-
nizations and so on) are not recognized as legal persons, and thus have no
standing at the international level. Sands, supra note 18, at 397.
24. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1989).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1989)
26. David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability, and Partnership: A Model
for Advocacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645, 2653
(1991).
27. Bruce Stokes, Storming the Bank, 1988 NAT'L J. 3250, 3253 (statement
of Douglas Hellinger, co-director of the Development Group for Alternative Poli-
des). The lack of transparency in the World Bank has prompted one commen-
tator to describe the institution's decisionmaking procedures as highly
secretive. Wirth, supra note 26, at 2653.
28. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 639 (Hersch Lau-
terpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (citations omitted). This idea is just as prevalent
today as it was then:
To describe international society as comprising a community of states
is to ignore reality. As a matter of political fact, the time is long past in
which states alone acted as "subjects" of international law. New tech-
nologies have given non-state actors the virtually unrestricted power
to transmit satellite broadcasting signals across the globe, to transfer
within moments vast sums of capital between banks in different states,
1996] 223
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B. OBSTACLES INHERENT IN THE WTO
1. Article XX
The original GATT allowed some environmental protection
measures, in Article XX, which allowed exceptions to GATT obli-
gations if "necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or
health, or relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources."29 Although Article XX was written in 1947, when en-
vironmental protection was not a major issue,3 0 the history of
Article XX indicates that it was intended to address environ-
mental concerns. 31
The history of Article XX's interpretation, however, reveals
a considerable amount of confusion. 32 For example, there is
confusion over whether Article XX can be used to protect foreign
life or health. While most commentators have determined that
Article XX is limited to domestic life or health, others have ar-
gued that the provision was intended to apply to foreign con-
and to run industries and plants which pollute massively across inter-
national borders.
Sands, supra note 18, at 400.
29. The provisions of Article XX which are relevant to the environment are
the following:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures: ... (b) necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health;... (g) relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption."
GATT, supra note 2, at art. XX.
30. Charnovitz, supra note 9, at 38. This is partly illustrated by the fact
that the word "environment" is not even mentioned in Article XX.
31. While there is no "legislative history" specifically for GATT Article XX,
earlier international discussions on an environmental exception for free trade
indicate that Article XX was intended to protect the environment. See
Charnovitz, supra note 9, at 38-47. In fact there was a general recognition of
an environmental exception to trade agreements as early as 1927. Id. at 42.
32. Id. at 49. See United States - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna
Products from Canada GATT, BISD, 29th U.N. 108 (panel report adopted Feb.
22, 1982); Canada, European Community, Mexico/United States - US taxes on
petroleum and certain imported substances GATT, BISD, 34th U.N. 136 (panel
report adopted on June 17, 1987); Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Un-
processed Herring and Salmon GATT, BISD 35th U.N. 114 (panel report
adopted March 22,1988); Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal
Taxes on Cigarettes GATT, BISD, 37th U.N. 200 (report adopted on November
7, 1990), Mexico/United States - United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
GATT, BISD 39th U.N. 155 (report issued on September 3, 1991).
(Vol. 5:219224
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cerns as well.3 3 All of this confusion has lead to the danger that
Article XX will become ineffective and make the WTO appear to
be an obstacle to environmental progress.3 4 Because of this,
critics have charged that Article XX lacks relevance to current
environmental problems 35 and offers scant support for resolving
trade and environment conflicts.36
Another problem is that countries no longer have the ability
to block an environmentally adverse panel ruling. Under the
original GATT system, any member state could block an adverse
panel ruling, since unanimity was required to adopt a panel re-
port (and thus even the losing party had to vote for its adoption).
Under the WTO, however, panel reports are automatically
adopted and it takes a negative consensus 37 to choose not to
adopt a panel report.38 Environmentalists fear that this will
put pressure on domestic environmental regulation and degrade
the current level of global environmental standards. 39
2. Transparency
The GATT suffered a same lack of transparency that has
also been the subject of criticism in many other IGOs. 40 In fact,
some critics described the GATT as having "secret" trade negoti-
33. Charnovitz, supra note 9, at 52.
34. Id. at 55.
35. Smith, supra note 9, at 538.
36. McSlarrow, supra note 6, at 10,594. One suggestion to make Article XX
more effective in protecting the environment is to change the phrase "necessary
to protect human, animal, or plant life or health" to a less stringent require-
ment of "relating to protection of human, animal, or plant life or health. Eliza
Patterson, International Trade and the Environment: Institutional Solutions,
21 ENVrL L. REP. 10,599, 10,602-03 (1991).
The requirement that a measure "relates to" protection of the environ-
ment should be met if the measure is consistent with, and a part of, the
framework of environmental policies of the nation imposing the mea-
sure. Such a "standard of proof" is sufficient to guard against the im-
position of protectionist measures under the guise of environmental
protection and it preserves each country's right to decide its own envi-
ronmental policies.
Id. at 10,603.
37. That is, the panel report is automatically adopted, unless there is a
unanimous vote not to adopt the report.
38. Judith H. Bello and Alan F. Holmer, Dispute Resolution in the New
World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits, 28 INT'L LAw. 1095, 1099
(1994).
39. See U.S. Seeks Review of Tuna-Dolphin Decision; Ruling Said to Un-
derrnine Environmental Laws, Intl Envtl. Daily (BNA), May 25, 1994 (state-
ment of David Schorr, trade policy specialist for the World Wildlife Fund)
available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAJED file.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
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ations which constituted "a sneak attack on democracy."4 1 Re-
cently, many have had reason to believe that the WTO will
follow the same course, despite the new provision allowing for
NGO consultative relations. In an effort to promote trans-
parency, the Clinton administration lobbied during the Fall of
1994 for observer status for environment, development, and
business NGOs in the new WTO Trade and Environment Com-
mittee.42 All other participating countries on the Committee
rejected the proposal, saying that the WTO is a governmental
organization and that NGOs have no place in it.4 3 Similarly,
applications for observer status by the Council of European and
Japanese National Shipping Associations and the American In-
stitute of Maritime Shipping were received by the Working
Party on Maritime Transport of the WTO's Council on Services,
with Chairman Christer Manhusen saying that non-governmen-
tal organizations should use other forums to express their
views. 44 This stance is disturbingly at odds with the new provi-
sion allowing for consultative relations, as well as with recent
GATT-NGO cooperation. 45
41. Sabotage! of America's Health, Food Safety and Environmental Laws,
WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1992, at A18.
42. U.S. Fails to Bring NGOs Into Talks With WTO's Environmental Com-
mittee, 17 Intl Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 762 (Sept. 21, 1994). "NGOs have much ex-
pertise to offer in the field of the environment, and their voice can help the
committee in its exploration of the link between trade and the environment,"
U.S. delegate Chris Marcich told the committee.
Marcich told the meeting the United States believes co-opting NGOs into
the work of the committee would make its work more transparent. "Non-trans-
parent proceedings perpetuate a fortress image of the (General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade) and diminish public confidence in and support for the work
of the WTO." Id.
43. Id. Interestingly, in 1971, the General Council of the GATT' established
the Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade, whose mission
was similar to the WTO Trade and Environment Committee. The group never
met until 1991, and its failure is often cited by environmentalists as a sign of
the GATT's lack of resolve to deal with environmental issues. See GATT to
Focus on Trade and Environmental Link, GATT Focus, Oct. 1991, at 1 [herein-
after GATT Focus].
44. U.S. Urges Broad Representation on Investigative Dispute Panels, 12
Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 295 (Feb. 15, 1995).
45. In June of 1994, the GATT organized a symposium of more than 500
representatives of industry, governments, and non-governmental organizations
to exchange views on how to wipe out the anomalies inherent in the relation-
ship between trade and the environment. Symposium Addresses Ways New
WTO Could Erase Trade, Environment Anomolies, 17 Int'l Envtl Rep. (BNA)
503 (June 15, 1994).
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II. NGOs
NGOs have existed since the nineteenth century.46 Be-
cause they are extremely varied in their makeup, however, there
is no consensus as to what an NGO is. The United Nations has
broadly defined an NGO as, "any international organization
which is not established by inter-governmental agreement."47
In its definition, however, the United Nations erroneously as-
sumes that NGOs are exclusively international groups.48 When
speaking only of international nongovernmental organizations,
the acronym INGO is more accurate, and avoids possible exclu-
sion of domestic groups from NGO status. The acronym NGO is
broader than INGO, and can include both domestic and interna-
tional groups.49
While some have argued for an even broader definition of an
NGO,50 the Union of International Associations (UIA), with
whom NGOs are registered for the United Nations, has set out a
much narrower definition. The UIA has established criteria for
an organization to be defined as an NGO: (1) it must have aims
which are truly international in character and manifest the in-
tention to engage in activities in at least three states; (2) the
membership must be drawn from individuals or collective enti-
ties of at least three states and must be open to any appropri-
ately qualified individual or entity in the organization's area of
operations; (3) the constitution must provide for the members
to periodically elect the governing body and officers; (4) the
headquarters and the officers should be rotated among the vari-
ous member states at designated intervals; the voting procedure
must be structured in such a way as to prevent control of the
organization by any one national group; and substantial finan-
46. The first NGO is considered to be the World's Evangelical Alliance,
founded in 1846. WERNER J. FELD & ROBERT S. JORDAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS 25 (1994). For an excellent account of the history of NGOs, see DouG-
LAS WILLIAMS, THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 259-69
(1987).
47. E. OsMANCzYK, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTER-
NATIONAL RELATIONS 565 (1990).
48. This is a common mistake when discussing NGOs. See, e.g. KIell Skjel-
sbaeck, The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the
Twentieth Century, 25 INT'L ORGANIZATION 420, 422 (1971) (abbreviating inter-
national nongovernmental organizations with the acronym NGO); see also infra
text accompanying notes 50-52.
49. See FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at xvii-xviii.
50. One scholar has expanded the definition by considering the representa-
tion of members from only two states to be sufficient if at least one of the repre-
sentatives is not a government official. Skjelsbaeck, supra note 48, at 422.
19961 227
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cial contributions to the budget must come from sources in at
least three states.51 This more specific definition, which also
fails to consider domestic NGOs, would actually exclude many
international societies in North America, "since their funds are
usually derived wholly from U.S. members."52
A satisfactory definition of an NGO probably lies some-
where between the broad U.N. definition and the stricter UIA
one. There are likely to be some exceptions, however, due to the
wide variety of NGOs and the broad range of purposes that they
serve.5 3 Although there are great differences among the vari-
ous definitions of an NGO, there seems to be general agreement
among scholars that most NGOs are private, voluntary, non-
profit organizations which may be local, national, or interna-
tional in nature. 54 Some NGOs are basically international pro-
fessional bodies; some have exclusively educational or research
purposes. Others have more philanthropic interests such as the
resolution of social problems, development in poor countries,
human rights, and the environment.55 NGOs often act by fulfil-
ling a number of duties, such as: advocacy of special interests of
public importance; providing expert advice in areas in which
governments have an interest, but in which their own resources
of information are i.adequate; acting as executing agents for a
number of U.N. Agencies operating in developing countries; and
publicizing the work of the United Nations and its specialized
agencies .56
A. NGO PARTICIPATON THROUGH CONSULTATIVE RELATIoNs
NGO participation has been most prominent in the United
Nations, particularly through its specialized agencies. NGOs
51. 3 UNION OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, YEARBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1733-34 (12th ed. 1994-1995).
52. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 22.
53. Some NGOs for example, even have government-related memberships,
such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the
International Union of Official Travel Organizations. FELD & JORDAN, supra
note 46, at 24.
54. Farouk Mawlawi, New Conflicts, New Challenges: The Evolving Role
for Non-Governmental Actors, 46 J. INT'L AFF. 391, 392 (1993). See also Karen
J. Jason, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in International Elec-
tion Observing, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1795, 1798 (1992); David Weissb-
rodt, The Contribution of International Nongovernmental Organizations to the
Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL
AND POLICY ISSUES 403, 406-408 (Theodor Merton ed., 1984).
55. PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 76 (1992); WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 263.
56. WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 265.
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participate in the United Nations under Article 71 of the U.N.
Charter which allows for consultative relations between the
U.N. Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC)57 and NGOs. 58
The main purposes for the consultative arrangements within the
U.N. system are to: (1) secure advice and technical cooperation
from competent NGOs, (2) enable organizations that represent
important elements of public opinion in many states to express
their views, and (3) advance the objectives of the U.N. system
through promotional activities and projects of NGOs. 59 Because
of its extensive experience with NGOs, the U.N. model of con-
sultative relations is enlightening.60
In implementing Article 71, the United Nations divided
NGOs into three categories according to the interest of the or-
ganization in the work of ECOSOC.6 1 NGOs placed into Cate-
gory I are deemed to "[be] concerned with most of the activities
of the Council,... have marked and sustained contributions to
make to the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations"
and have considerable membership that is "representative of
major segments of population in a large number of countries."62
NGOs in Category I may attend meetings of ECOSOC, submit
written statements, be granted hearings before ECOSOC, and
propose agenda items for consideration. Category II NGOs are
those whose competence lies in only a few of the fields of activity
covered by ECOSOC. These NGOs have all of the privileges of
those in Category I, except the right to propose agenda items.
The third category is the Roster, intended for NGOs that can
57. While ECOSOC was originally supposed to handle economic and social
matters within the United Nations, its influence has not been as great as many
had expected. Since all NGO activity is channeled through ECOSOC, NGOs
have suffered from ECOSOC's failuRes. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 223.
58. Article 71 of the U.N. Charter reads: The Economic and Social Council
may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental orga-
nizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such ar-
rangements may be made with international organizations and, where
appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of
the United Nations concerned. U.N. Charter art. 71. For a history of NGO con-
sultative relations with the United Nations, see Michael M. Gunter, Toward a
Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental
Organizations? 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 557 (1977).
59. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 224.
60. Moreover, the language providing for consultative relations in Article
V.2 of the WTO Charter, is quite similar to that of Article 71 of the U.N. Char-
ter. See supra notes 4 and 58.
61. Arrangements for Consultation with Non-Governmental Organizations,
U.N. ECOSOC Res. 1296(XLIV), 44th Sess., U.N. No. 1, at 21, U.N. Doc. E/4548
(1968).
62. Id.
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make occasional and useful contributions. Those on the Roster
have extremely limited privileges, including the right to attend
meetings and the right to submit (substantially shorter) written
statements. Many U.N. specialized agencies have also estab-
lished consultative relations with NGOs. While some have fol-
lowed the ECOSOC classification scheme,6 3 many others simply
maintain one single list of NGOs.64
NGO consultative relations in the United Nations have
been severely criticized as weak and ineffective,65 and the
ECOSOC classification system has been described as artificial
and impractical. 66 Moreover, in the past, consultative relations
have suffered from a lack of communication between NGOs and
the various branches of the United Nations, which is exacer-
bated by the vast number of NGOs that often clog the channels
of communication. 67 The fact that NGOs have no access to the
General Assembly, which often deals with the substantive mat-
ters of concern to NGOs, further compounds the communication
problem.68 Finally, there have long been complaints that NGOs
from wealthy, western countries dominate activities, and that
there is a lack of geographical balance. 69 Despite the shortcom-
ings of consultative relations, overall NGO involvement in the
U.N. system has been highly successful. "I have seen countless
examples of the practical contribution which NGOs can and do
make to our work.... Indeed, wherever one looks at the work of
the United Nations, one sees how valuable is the contribution
which is being made by NGOs." 70 The same success is true of
63. These agencies follow the ECOSOC classification scheme: The United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Labor Organization (ILO).
FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 224-25.
64. These agencies simply classify all NGOs together: the World Health
Organization (WHO), the International Civil Aviation Organizations (ICAO),
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion (IMCO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Na-
tions Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD), and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).
Gunter, supra note 58, at 570-71.
65. FELD & JoRDAN, supra note 46, at 222.
66. Gunter, supra note 58, at 579.
67. Id. at 580-81.
68. Id. at 581.
69. Jason, supra note 53, at 1830; Gunter, supra note 58, at 582.
70. Gunter, supra note 58, at 572 (quoting Message from the Secretary-Gen-
eral to the Regional Conference of NGO's Organized by the Office of Public Infor-
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NGO relations with other international organizations, "in fact,
in some instances, the work of [IGOs] could not go forward with-
out the participation of [NGOsI."71
B. NGO CONTRIBUTIONS TO IGOs
One of the most important NGO functions is to act as a link
to the public. Originally, the United Nations envisioned that
NGOs "would bring to the deliberations of the U.N. a cross sec-
tion of world public opinion."72 This connection to the public
also works conversely: "The United Nations needs the support of
public opinion in all its efforts ... The United Nations cannot
enter the public relations business, but that is a role which the
non-governmental organizations can assume."73 Perhaps the
most important NGO function, however, is the gathering, evalu-
ation, and dissemination of information. 74 In fact, many NGOs
base their credibility on information that is often more detailed,
and available for longer periods of time, than that accumulated
by states and IGOs. 75 Consequently, NGO reports often become
the basis of official discussion. 76 NGOs are very effective in us-
ing this information to lobby the media and influence public
opinion, especially at international conferences. 77  In recent
years, this has been a significant factor in raising public aware-
ness about the major issues at conferences such as the U.N. Con-
mation of the United Nations in Cooperation with the Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, Thailand (May 27-29, 1975),
reprinted in 28 INT'L AFF. 282 (1976)).
71. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 217.
72. EDwIN A. BOCK, REPRESENTATION OF NON-GovERNMENTAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS 15 (1955).
73. Statement of former Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, quoted in Ed-
ward J. Lacey, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in World Affairs,
TRANSNAT'L ASS'NS, May-June 1988, at 138, 139 (citing Report of Annual Con-
ference of the Non-Governmental Organizations Listed with the United Nations
Office of Public Information 10 (1972)).
74. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 229. NGOs use many methods to
gather information: reading relevant laws, reviewing periodicals, studying doc-
uments, contacting individuals, and pursuing on-site investigations. Weissb-
rodt, supra note 53, at 404. NGOs can serve as information brokers to delegates
at international conferences, and have a major impact on the decision making
process. A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the
Development of International Law, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 68 (1993).
75. "[I]f such organizations [i.e. NGOs] are to be successful, their research
must be perceived as independent, credible, and accessible." Note, Develop-
ments in the Law - International Environmental Law, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1484,
1533 (1991) [hereinafter Developments].
76. Jason, supra note 53, at 1800.
77. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 234.
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ference on Environment and Development in 1992,78 and the
recent U.N. Conference on Women in Beijing.7 9
NGOs also make more direct contributions to IGOs, offering
valuable advice and technical assistance based on the experi-
ence of their members.8 0 NGO members were recruited by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (TAEA) to monitor Iraq's
compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, and have
worked with IGOs and individual states to ameliorate starva-
tion in Somalia.81 It is often easier for NGOs to monitor compli-
ance with international standards and rules since unlike IGOs,
they do not need an invitation to enter a country and observe.8 2
Moreover, because they possess no formal ties to any govern-
ment, NGOs are often more vocal in their opinions, whereas
IGOs usually try to remain as apolitical as possible. 83 Such
scrutiny can be very effective, because governments are sensi-
tive to criticism of their policies, especially in an international
forum.8 4 Because they can make so many contributions to
78. Hazel Henderson, At Rio, NGOs Were Again Out in Front, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, June 25, 1992, at 19.
79. Abigail Abrash & Laurel Fletcher, ... And an Unhelpful U.N., WASH.
POST, Oct. 1, 1995 at C7. NGOs have been involved, however, in U.N. confer-
ences for a number of years. "[T]hree recent examples, the United Nations Con-
ference on the Human Environment, the World Population Conference, and the
World Food Conference, have demonstrated that positive contributions can re-
sult from the closer involvement of non-governmental organizations in the work
of the United Nations." Report of the Secretary-General In Response to Recom-
mendations of the Committee and of Economic and Social Council Resolutions
1739 (LIV) and 1740 (LIV), U.N. Doc. E/C.2/768, at 3-4 (1975) (Statement of
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim).
80. Jason, supra note 53, at 1817-18. This technical assistance can be
quite significant. According to a survey, the external assistance provided by
NGOs to low-income states in 1973 was estimated to be over $1 billion. FELD &
JORDAN, supra note 46, at 226.
81. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 218. NGOs often provide direct re-
lief in the form of food, blankets, medicine, and education. Weissbrodt, supra
note 53, at 425.
82. Jason, supra note 53, at 1819. They can be somewhat limited in this
respect, however, depending on their financial resources, which are usually
much smaller than that of IGOs.
83. Id. at 1818-19.
84. This seems to hold true for every kind of government, from open democ-
racies to dictatorships, from the United States to the former Soviet Union to
Guatemala. Weissbrodt, supra note 53, at 410-12. For example, in response to
criticism over human rights abuses from the International Commission of Ju-
rists, the Chilean government responded through a series of half-page adver-
tisements in the New York Times and Washington Post. Id. at 411 n. 42.
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IGOs, "for many issue areas . .. [NGOs] are now essential ad-
juncts of IGOs."8 5
Although NGOs have traditionally lacked standing in inter-
national judicial proceedings,8 6 more and more courts are be-
ginning to recognize NGOs as amicus participants in
international cases.8 7 While amicus briefs add to a court's
workload, they accept them because of their benefits. Amicus
briefs offer a more detailed analysis of law and legislative his-
tory than that offered by the parties; arguments that the parties
may be unwilling to make due to political considerations; and
knowledge of the broader implications of decisions than the par-
ties may have considered, as well as other expert knowledge.88
Consequently, many international courts now recognize the le-
gitimacy of non-state actors in their cases.8 9
NGOs also possess diplomatic skills that governments and
IGOs often lack. In many situations, bilateral or multilateral
negotiations may be ineffective or impossible due to hostility be-
tween the parties or because of the bias of government repre-
sentatives in presenting their own views. In these cases,
unofficial mediation 90 by an NGO can be a more effective solu-
85. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 246. NGOs have become important
in electoral monitoring, see generally Jason, supra note 53, and have made a
significant contribution to conflict mediation. See Mawlawi, supra note 53, at
392. This is especially true of the American Friends Service Committee and the
British Friends - best known as the Quakers. They have been active in many
areas, including: the Middle East in 1955 and 1967; between the two Germanys
from 1962 to 1973; during the 1965 India-Pakistan war; and the Nigeria-Biafra
war from 1968-69. Id. at 395.
86. "The ability of a nongovernmental organization to initiate an interna-
tional case or intervene as a party is limited because in many international
courts only states may be parties to proceedings." Shelton, supra note 21, at
612.
87. Id. at 616.
88. Id. at 618. Amicus filings at the United States Supreme Court in the
late 1960s and early 1970s were present in 63.8 percent of noncommercial
cases. Id.
89. The regional "international" legal systems of the European Community
and the Nordic Community have both recognized the legal personality of NGOs.
Sands, supra note 18, at 413. The North American Free Trade Agreement, the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, and the United Nations Compensation
Commission, established after the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, have all recog-
nized non-state participants. Shelton, supra note 21, at 612 n.2. The European
Court of Justice accepts amicus curiae, as does the European Court of Human
Rights. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has extensive amicus par-
ticipation, and has even begun to accept NGO oral participation. Id. at 628-
640.
90. Unofficial mediation is defined as "mediation in international disputes
by persons who are not employed by or responsible to a national government or
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tion.91 An NGO's role as a mediator often stems from its in-
volvement in related activities and a comprehensive knowledge
and understanding of the issues.92 Moreover, they may be able
to offer a more politically neutral assessment of the dispute, as
well as a unique perspective toward its resolution. 93
C. NGO CONTRIBUTIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
NGOs have achieved remarkable results in the area of
human rights.94 Since World War II, a great proliferation of
NGOs has been partly responsible for the emergence of human
rights as a major international issue.95 In fact, according to the
former Director of the U.N. Division of Human Rights, the inclu-
sion of human rights in the U.N. Charter was the "result of the
insistence of nongovernmental organizations and individuals at
the San Francisco Conference. It is a matter of record that had
it not been for the determined role played by these organizations
and individuals, the place assigned to human rights in the Char-
ter might have been less pronounced."96 Others have stated
that they were partly responsible for the fall of authoritarian
regimes in Eastern Europe.97 The activities of a number of
NGOs have been at the forefront in monitoring the status of
human rights.98 They have caused executions to be stayed, tor-
ture to be stopped, prisoners to be released, and have raised the
general awareness of the fundamental rights of citizens.99
an inter-governmental organization." Sydney D. Bailey, Non-official Mediation
in Disputes: Reflections on Quaker Experience, 61 INT'L AFF. 205 (1985).
91. Mawlawi, supra note 53, at 396-97.
92. Id. at 401. Moreover, as a mediator, their political status is less likely
to be of concern, since they will not have the same bias as that of the conflicting
parties, nor will they have to worry about political tradeoffs in finding a solu-
tion. See Tarlock, supra note 74, at 65.
93. See Mawlawi, supra note 53, at 398-99.
94. See Weissbrodt, supra note 53, for a general discussion of NGO activity
in the field of human rights. NGOs have also been very active in the related
field of disarmament. See FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 231-33.
95. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 227.
96. Id. (quoting Theo van Boven, opening of the 36th session of the Com-
mission on Human Rights (1980)).
97. Symposium, Transitions to Democracy and the Rule of Law, 5 Am. U.J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 965, 979 (1990) (remarks of Hugo Fruhling).
98. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 228.
99. Weissbrodt, supra note 53, at 411. For example, Chile released several
hundred political prisoners in 1976 in response to U.N. and NGO criticism. Id.
at 419 n.79. In fact, the NGO, Amnesty International, has been responsible for
helping to release thousands of political prisoners and raise overall conscious-
ness regarding human rights abuses. Id. at 427-28.
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Some of the larger and more prominent human rights NGOs,
such as Amnesty International100 and the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, have been instrumental in drafting
human rights law. 10 1
NGOs have also been very successful in working to protect
the environment. 0 2 "In many respects, [NGOs] have come to
be the primary source of expression for the international desire
to protect the environment, and number among its most effec-
tive guardians." 03 They have been vital to the development of
domestic environmental law,' 0 4 and have made major accom-
plishments internationally as well. For example, the NGO
Friends of the Earth convinced the Commission of the European
Communities to investigate the United Kingdom's proposal for
privatization of the water industry.'0 5 Similarly, Greenpeace of
Luxembourg helped get a judgment by the European Court of
Justice to temporarily shut down a nuclear power plant that
failed to comply with European Community procedures.' 0 6
100. Amnesty International's contribution to human rights earned it the
1977 Nobel Peace Prize.
101. Amnesty International played a major role in the elaboration of the
U.N. Declaration of the Protection of All Persons Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1979), and the Red
Cross was instrumental in developing the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Con-
ventions. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 228.
102. Interestingly, the environment and human rights share some common-
alties with regard to international law:
Although rights and obligations at international law have traditionally
run to states and not directly to individuals, commentators have docu-
mented the recognition of limited international legal personality for in-
dividuals - particularly in the context of human rights - as well as
the emergence of a 'new human right to a healthful and decent envi-
ronment.' Intergovernmental agreements proclaim the principle that
environmental rights and obligations run to individuals, and clearly it
is 'human beings and not legal constructions, such as States, [that] suf-
fer from the degradation of the environment.'
Developments, supra note 75, at 1600 (footnotes omitted) (quoting W. GORMLEY,
HuMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERA-
TION 2 (1976), and Hull & Koers, Introduction to a Convention on the Interna-
tional Environmental Protection Agency, 1971 LAW OF THE SEA INST. I, IX
(Occasional Paper No. 12)).
103. Sands, supra note 18, at 394.
104. See 135 Cong. Rec. S1392 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Chafee, stating that non-governmental organizations' ability to bring suit in the
United States are vital to ensure that Congress properly implements and courts
fully enforce environmental laws). "Recent studies indicate that amici have had
a significant impact on the development of constitutional and environmental
law within the United States." Shelton, supra note 21, at 616.
105. EC Warning on Future Standards of UK Water, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 7,
1989, at 2.
106. See Case 187/87, Saarland v. Ministry of Industry 1988 E.C.R. 5013.
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NGOs also play an increasingly important role in the negotia-
tion, ratification, implementation and enforcement of interna-
tional environmental agreements; their presence at these
agreements has become routine. 10 7 They have been present at
the Framework Convention on Climate Change,108 as well as
the Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty.10 9 More
recently, NGOs were very influential at the U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development in Rio De Janeiro. More than
7,000 NGOs gathered at the Global Forum, an NGO-organized
counterconference. 1" 0 NGOs had a great effect on the interna-
tional press corps and worked hard to influence legislators,
many of whom attended the Global Forum.'
One NGO which merits special attention is the Interna-
tional Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), also known
as the World Conservation Union. By its fortieth anniversary in
1988, its remarkably diverse membership included sixty-one
states and 128 government bodies, 383 national and thirty-three
international NGOs, and a few affiliated members. 1 2 The
IUCN has an Environmental Law Centre in Bonn and convenes
a triennial General Assembly of its members, where it passes
resolutions which are then presented to governments and other
relevant bodies. 113 Early on, the IUCN perceived the need to
link the environment and development, and provide knowledge
and leadership for sustainable development." 4 It helps govern-
ments develop international declarations and conventions,
sometimes providing first drafts through its Environmental Law
Centre, and has been an important player in several interna-
tional environmental conferences and conventions." 5
107. Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary
Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEo. L.J. 675, 693 (1993).
108. Id. (citing Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 849).
109. See Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Treaty Regarding the
Antarctic, June 21, 1991, S. TREATY Doc. No. 22, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), 30
I.L.M. 1455, 1460 (stating that representatives of "international governmental
and non-governmental organizations attended the Meeting as observers").
110. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 236-40.
111. Id.
112. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 55, at 77-78.
113. Id.
114. The RUCN prepared the "IUCN/WWF/UNEP World Conservation
Strategy, published in 1980, in which FAO and Unesco also collaborated. This
lays down principles for conservation of living resources and for legal develop-
ments which will enable their sustainable utilization." Id. at 78.
115. "[The IUCN] has worked on a Convention on Preservation of Biological
Diversity and an Earth Charter or Declaration for adoption by the UNCED, and
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NGOs successfully lobbied the World Bank to improve their
environmental record. 116 The Bank admits making serious er-
rors in the past by funding projects that severely damaged the
environment. For example, a $112 million irrigation and reset-
tlement project in Kenya resulted in tropical forest destruction,
contamination of drinking water, and rampant disease. The
Bank's own evaluation of the project declared it an environmen-
tal disaster. 11 7 Similarly, a colonization project in northwest
Brazil had disastrous consequences, and prompted the Bank's
president to admit error.' Bank senior vice president, Moeen
Qureshi, has said, "Our progress against poverty, after 40 years
of effort, has been disappointing. The Bank and NGOs can and
must work together."119  In response, NGOs have lobbied
against the Bank's environmentally risky ventures and have en-
couraged the Bank to take a more environmentally conscious ap-
proach to development.1 20 Despite initial hostility, the Bank
has expressed an appreciation for working with NGOs. Accord-
ing to vice president Qureshi, "We can not achieve quality re-
sults without the active, creative and critical involvement of
many NGOs."' 21 Another Bank official has stated, "The Bank's
renewed emphasis on [combating] poverty is partly in response
to NGO concerns .. . [and] [t]he Bank's increased emphasis on
environment is, even more clearly, in response to NGO
concerns."
122
III. PURSUING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
THROUGH NGO CONSULTATIVE RELATIONS
Environmental problems have serious implications for indi-
viduals within an immediate region, and in other parts of the
has previously contributed to the 1972 World Heritage Convention, the 1973
Convention on Trade in Endangered Species, the 1971 Convention on Wetlands
of International Importance, and the 1979 Convention on Conservation of Mi-
gratory Species of Wild Animals." Id.
116. See also infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
117. Wirth, supra note 26, at 2649 n.17.
118. Id.
119. Stokes, supra note 27, at 3253.
120. For example, the Washington-based NGO Results rallied pressure on
the Bank to conduct a poverty impact assessment before lending money. In
response, the Bank created an antipovery task force. Id. at 3251. Concerned
about a loan for a Brazil nuclear power development, German NGOs pressured
the West German government to ask that the loan be postponed. Id.
121. Id. at 3250 (statement of Bank senior vice president Moeen Qureshi).
122. Id. (according to an internal Bank document on Bank-NGO
cooperation).
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world. Consequently, "we are in a situation that calls not only
for implementation of existing principles but also for a new ap-
proach, through the development of new principles of interna-
tional law." 123 Sustainable development is vital to prosperity in
the next century, but unfortunately, "[tihe few mechanisms that
purport to address both trade and environmental policies are
woefully inadequate to that task."124 There has recently been
support in the GATT to take up environmental concerns,' 25 and
the new WTO may be the best vehicle to address trade and the
environment together.' 26 As one commentator has put it:
In the next two decades, the joining of environmental protection and
economic development will grow. The burgeoning new field of environ-
ment and trade reflects this linkage. While trade law has operated
under the relatively unified and broad framework of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for more than forty years, fledgling
international environmental law still consists only of many separate
and disparate legal instruments. It is not surprising then that most
environment and trade issues are discussed almost exclusively within
the GATT context.
12 7
In seeking to achieve sustainable development, however, the
WTO needs to consult with NGOs.
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
states that "[e]nvironmental issues are best handled with the
123. Declaration of the Hague (March 11, 1989), reprinted in Sands, supra
note 18, at 418. Some have even gone so far as to suggest giving legal rights to
the environment itself. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Stand-
ing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
Supreme Court Justice Douglas has reiterated this view: "The critical question
of 'standing' would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we. .. allowed
environmental issues to be litigated.., in the name of the inanimate object
about to be despoiled, defaced or invaded...." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 741 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
124. McSlarrow, supra note 6, at 10,589. "[T]he international system, in
which states are the primary actors, has been criticized as being 'unecological'
and unprepared to handle global environmental problems. The need to restruc-
ture international institutions to provide an effective response to global envi-
ronmental problems has long been recognized and is still being championed
today." Rubinton, supra note 15, at 478 (citations omitted).
125. The United States, Mexico, and the European Community all ex-
pressed support in 1991 for the revival of the Group on Environmental Meas-
ures and International Trade. See GATT Focus, supra note 43, at 2.
126. See, e.g., McSlarrow, supra note 6, at 10,593, "An international regime
that provides principles that squarely address both environmental protection
and growth is necessary in order to ensure that both goals are maximized...
[GATT] offers the best available vehicle for a resolution of their tensions." Id.
See also Smith, supra note 9, at 544 (suggesting that the GATT is a logical
forum to address rules on trade and the environment).
127. Weiss, supra note 104, at 707-08 (citation omitted).
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participation of all concerned citizens." 128 Since individuals are
excluded from international participation, IGOs commonly turn
to NGOs to reflect the interests of the people. 129 In this role,
NGOs have become "the environment's moral, if not legal,
guardians." 30 Because of this, "[tihe political role of non-gov-
ernmental organizations... should be expressly recognized by
governments, and these groups should then be given an in-
creased legal role."'13 Unless NGOs assume an expanded role,
we risk the same kind of political inaction that followed the dis-
aster at Chernobyl.' 3 2
A. IMPROVING UPON THE U.N. MODEL
The NGO classification systems employed by the U.N. and
its specialized agencies can be used as models for NGO classifi-
cation in the WTO. 133 These systems, however, do suffer cer-
tain shortcomings134 which can be improved upon. To avoid
clogging the system with too many NGOs,' 35 there should be a
grant of temporary consultative status to NGOs that only have
128. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and De-
velopment, supra note 7, at princ. 10. This idea was reaffirmed at the London
Conference on Saving the Ozone Layer, March 5-7, 1989, by British Prime Min-
ister Margaret Thatcher. She stated that environmental problems are not "for
governments alone. It would require co-operation with science and industry
and the understanding and participation of individuals." Thatcher Calls for
Stricter Targets, FIN. TIMEs., Mar. 6, 1989, at 12.
129. Sands, supra note 18, at 401.
130. Id. at 412.
While four decades ago we could speak of an international system fo-
cused almost exclusively on nation-states and their subunits, today the
system includes national governments (and local governments), inter-
governmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations as
essential components constantly interacting. NGOs are likely to con-
tinue to expand their influence.... The information revolution should
greatly facilitate this increased role of NGOs in international environ-
mental decisionmaking.
Weiss, supra note 107, at 709.
131. Sands, supra note 18, at 395 n.12.
132. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64. In fact, NGOs wishing to
participate in WTO matters could be classified according to their classification
with ECOSOC. This has been suggested as well for the International Court of
Justice, since "such status provides some evidence of the broad representation
and interests of the organization, as well as indicates a degree of familiarity
with the international system. In addition, it provides a straightforward crite-
rion to limit the potential pool of [participants]...." Shelton, supra note 21, at
642.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
135. Similar concerns have caused the ICJ to refuse NGO participation.
The Registrar of the Court stated that it was "unwilling to open the floodgates
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peripheral relations with the WTO, but are concerned with one
particular item.' 3 6 A system of periodic review of consultative
status could serve to demote or remove those NGOs whose in-
volvement has declined, and promote those NGOs whose in-
volvement has increased. 13 7  Moreover, the WTO should
encourage NGOs to work together in preparing and submitting
joint statements, to avoid repetition and reduce volume.' 38 The
U.N. suffers from a lack of communication with NGOs' 3 9 which
the WTO needs to guard against in its consultative relations.
One way to do this is to designate officials in the Secretariat,
each of the four Councils, the various Committees and other
sub-units, to act as contacts with NGOs.' 40 Additionally, each
party to the WTO could appoint an NGO ambassador, allowing
for direct input with each national delegation.141
The WTO needs to ensure that NGOs are politically and fi-
nancially independent from governmental influence. "[A]n NGO
should be in a position to constructively criticize governmental
policy and should not feel inhibited in doing so by danger of los-
ing its financial basis .... [It] should assure its autonomous
existence before turning to government assistance."142  In
1967, this problem was illustrated by accusations of undue gov-
ernmental influence over NGOs in the United Nations. These
accusations forced ECOSOC to tighten the requirements for con-
sultative status and expel any NGOs that were not totally in-
dependent from their home governments. 143
The WTO must strike a delicate geographical balance in
NGO representation to avoid the usual domination by Western
NGOs.' 4 4 There must also be a representational balance be-
tween competing interests, to avoid accusations of unequal
influence. 14
to what might be a vast amount of proffered assistance." Correspondence of the
Registrar to Prof. Reisman, 1970 ICJ Pleadings (2 Legal Consequences) 638-39.
136. See Gunter, supra note 58, at 583.
137. See id. at 584.
138. See id. at 585.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
140. See Gunter, supra note 58, at 584.
141. See id.
142. JAMES E. KNOTT JR., FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A STUDY OF THE ROLE
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMERGING COUN-
TRIES 68 (1962).
143. Gunter, supra note 58, at 564-65.
144. Id. at 585-86; Jason, supra note 53, at 1830-32
145. See generally Lewis Rosman, Public Participation in International Pes-
ticide Regulation: When the Codex Commission Decides, Who Will Listen?, 12
VA. ENVTL L.J. 329 (1993) (discussing the dominance of industry group partici-
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Most importantly, the WTO must use caution when grant-
ing consultative status, since some NGOs can hinder the process
in pursuit of their own agendas. "[O]fficials... are in a state of
more or less perpetual irritation with the environmentalists for
what is often seen as their demand for absolutes, their unwill-
ingness or inability to comprehend the reality of international
politics, and the processes of negotiation among sovereign
states."146 The WTO must be careful to limit the participation
of those NGOs that do not respect the political realities of inter-
national relations.
WTO officials who oppose NGO involvement are correct in
saying that the WTO is a governmental organization. 147 As a
former U.N. Secretary-General said regarding NGOs, "It should
be emphasized that the consultative relationship does not imply
the intervention of non-governmental organizations in the deci-
sion-making process that is the proper domain of Govern-
ments.' 48 WTO officials are mistaken, however, if they believe
that NGOs cannot make valuable contributions to the WTO.
B. WORKING WITH NGOs
"Environmental policy-making is only as good as its pri-
mary information system." 49 To harmonize trade policy deci-
sions with principles of sustainable development, the WTO
should turn to NGOs as reliable sources of information.' 50 Gov-
ernments and IGOs often do not have sufficient resources to
gather the information that is essential to a sound environmen-
tal decision. This, however, is often the primary work product of
environmental NGOs. For example, concerning a recent case in
the International Court of Justice, one commentator stated:
[Ilt is not clear that the parties have the resources or information from
long-term monitoring that would provide a fill assessment of the po-
tential environmental harm from the project. Such information is es-
sential to the case . . . [and] is available, from nongovernmental
organizations that have been monitoring the [area] for years.151
NGOs can serve as valuable information brokers to the WTO.
Such information can be useful in determining ecological stan-
pation to the detriment of consumer participation in the Codex Alimentarius
negotiations).
146. PHILIP W. QuiGG, A POLE APART 179 (1983).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
148. U.N. Doc. E/C.2/768, at 3 (1975).
149. ROBERT A. SmNN, THE INTERNATIONAL POLrrIcs OF MARINE POLLUTION
CONTROL 124 (1974).
150. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
151. Shelton, supra note 21, at 626.
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dards for sustainable development. 152  Moreover, the WTO
could turn to NGOs (such as the IUCN and its Environmental
Law Centre) to formulate policies on sustainable develop-
ment.153 It could also encourage these NGOs to offer assistance
to states and government officials who wish to harmonize their
trade and environment policies.154
The WTO can ask NGOs to develop environmental impact
assessments of proposed trade measures which may impact the
environment, or conversely, on environmental measures which
may impact free trade. 55 Environmental impact assessments
allow the public to access information concerning how proposed
measures will effect the environment before such measures are
adopted. This would facilitate public discussion outside of the
WTO before measures are implemented, permitting the WTO to
more accurately measure public opinion. This could also im-
prove the public's opinion of the WTO 56 and avoid much of the
controversy over environmental matters that plagued the
GATT.157
The WTO can also improve its global image by using NGOs
as a link to the public. 158 "Because their activities implicate the
interests of thousands of local, national, and international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) environmental IGOs con-
sider the public's views primarily by granting nonvoting
observer or consultative status to NGOs."' 59 The WTO can im-
152. Garner, supra note 14, at 1080.
153. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
154. See Garner, supra note 14, at 1079.
155. For a general discussion of environmental impact assessment, see
Nicholas A. Robinson, International Trends in Environmental Impact Assess-
ment, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. R.v. 591 (1992). The U.S. National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1988) contains an
environmental impact assessment provision at § 4332(2)(C).
156. "Greater involvement of non-State actors can bring useful information
to the decision making process and thus improve the scientific credibility and,
in turn, the effectiveness of the resulting rules." Developments, supra note 75,
at 1602.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41. Etienne Vernet of the Paris-
based Collective for Environment has stated that the WTO is not the proper
forum to discuss environmental concerns. He feels that environmental con-
cerns are not being woven into the process and that government representa-
tives are neither competent nor authorized to raise environmental concerns.
He stated, "As long as liberalization of trade will rhyme with de-regulation or
the protection of some economic interests, all initiatives to protect the environ-
ment and achieve social equity will be undermined." Inter Press Service, Dec.
10, 1993 available in LEXIS, News library, INPRES file.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
159. Developments, supra note 75, at 1588 (citation omitted).
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prove its transparency by using NGOs to inform and influence
the public, and by encouraging them to disseminate information
concerning its policies and proceedings. 160 The WTO could al-
low NGOs to have observer status at sessions of the Ministerial
Conference, the various councils and committees, and the Dis-
pute Settlement Body.161 Those NGOs attending will then be
able to relay their observations to the general public, making the
WTO more transparent than the GATT.162
The Dispute Settlement Body could utilize NGO input, not
only for information on environmental matters, but also in the
case of proving damage to the environment, or a loss in trade
benefits due to an allegedly protectionist environmental trade
measure.163
Conflicting estimates of environmental damage result not only from
scientific uncertainty, but also from politics.... One way to narrow the
range of estimates is to entrust research to scientists perceived to be
neutral and objective.... [N]on-governmental organizations (NGOs)
can play an important role in this respect.1
64
After coming to a decision, the Dispute Settlement Body can use
NGOs to monitor compliance. "NGOs are often quite effective in
investigating and publicizing transgressions."165 Finally, the
Dispute Settlement Body might consider allowing NGOs to sub-
mit amicus briefs in cases that have environmental
implications. 166
160. Garner, supra note 14, at 1080.
161. For details on the various councils and committees of the WTO, see
WTO Charter, supra note 1.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
163. International law generally will provide compensation for environmen-
tal damage upon the presentation of precise evidence of loss. See Fisheries Ju-
risdiction (F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3,203-04 (July 25) (stating that the Court
will award compensation only upon a concrete submission regarding the exist-
ence and amount of each damage). See generally Trail Smelter Arbitration
(U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Trail Smelter Arb. Trib. 1941) (states must
prove damages by documenting an actual difference in the value of its property
before and after the harm).
164. Developments, supra note 75, at 1532 (citation omitted).
165. Id. at 1606.
166. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. Professor Shelton dis-
cussed some of the advantages that amici have over full participation:
[An amicus] is generally less costly and time consuming than mounting
a full case, allowing the organization to share the litigation burden
with the parties; amici are not bound by the decision and not prevented
from relitigating issues in the case should the holding be unfavorable;
unlike experts or witnesses, they generally may raise any issue the
court could raise on its own motion and are not limited by questions
presented to them or to matters pleaded by the parties....
Shelton, supra note 21 at 611.
4Miv. J GLOBAL TRADE
C. CONFRONTING RESISTANCE TO NGOs THROUGH NGO
PARTNERSHIPS
The greatest opposition addressing both trade and the envi-
ronment in the same context will most likely come from develop-
ing countries. 167 This is partly because environmental issues
are not of the same importance to developing countries as they
are to wealthier ones. 168 But the issues are inextricably linked,
since a higher standard of living enables greater care for the en-
vironment.169 The approach that needs to be taken toward the
environment is one that recognizes the divergent needs and pri-
orities between nations at different stages of development. 170
Developing countries tend to resist international participa-
tion by NGOs. This is based on an incorrect assumption that
NGOs only reflect the concerns and interests of developed coun-
tries. 17 ' This may be due to the fact that "'monolithic' states
have genuine difficulties in understanding the operations of
more pluralistic societies, and the fact that many NGOs grew up
in an age of imperialism and mainly in 'imperialist' countries
taints them in the eyes of some elements in countries which for-
merly were dependent territories." 72 Contrary to this notion,
NGOs often expose the problems created by the governments of
developed countries.173 In fact, many NGOs are devoted to lob-
bying the governments of developed countries and educating
them about the problems of developing countries. 74 A more
likely reason that some governments are opposed to NGO partic-
ipation (but one that is harder for them to admit) is that NGOs
generally represent minority views. These views are otherwise
167. Developing countries were strongly opposed to the Group on Environ-
mental Measures and International Trade. See supra note 43.
168. See Patrick Low, Trade and the Environment: What Worries The Devel-
oping Countries?, 23 ENVTL. L. 705 (1993).
169. Id. at 706. This is not to say, however, that if societies attain economic
growth, all will be well with the environment. Id.
170. Id. at 706-07.
171. WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 259. This idea is especially misguided con-
cerning the environment. Since environmental hazards are not limited to na-
tional boundaries, NGOs that are concerned with the environment necessarily
have an interest in environmental problems worldwide.
172. Id. at 263.
173. Id. In fact, more and more NGOs from developing countries are partici-
pating on the international level. For example, the 1986 FAO Development Ed-
ucation Exchange Papers contain contributions from NGOs in Canada, France,
Peru, India, Zaire, the Philippines, Australia and Columbia. Id. at 264.
174. Stokes, supra note 27, at 3251. See also WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at
263.
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not heard on the international level, and all governments tend
to find them unwelcome at one time or another. 175
In order to be most effective on the international level, de-
veloped and developing country NGOs need to be mutually de-
pendent on one another. 176 This mutual dependency manifests
itself in a form of partnership that has been quite effective inter-
nationally. One example of this is the partnership between the
Sri Lankan NGO, Environmental Foundation, Ltd. (EFL) and
the U.S. NGO, the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC).' 77 In response to a much criticized proposal for a for-
estry loan to Sri Lanka, EFL and NRDC formed a partnership to
encourage the World Bank to reconsider the loan. Drawing on
the political connections of NRDC and the local knowledge and
expertise of EFL, the two groups were able to persuade the
World Bank to delay formal consideration of the loan, and per-
mit further investigation. They were successful in getting both
the United States and Sri Lankan governments to express seri-
ous reservations about the proposed loan, and finally were able
to condition the loan on public scrutiny of its implementation.1 78
Ironically, despite initial hostility to the two NGOs, the World
Bank later cited this loan as one of its best.1 79
The partnership model is effective because NGOs comple-
ment each other's strengths and weaknesses. Because of their
experience and financial backing, developed country NGOs tend
to be stronger lobbyists at the international level.180 On the
other hand, because they have a direct stake in the outcome of
policy decisions, developing country NGOs have a better per-
175. WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 264. This phenomenon was noted at the
World Bank, "NGOs often are part of the political opposition in Third World
countries, and many governments balk at involving rival elements in their eco-
nomic planning." Stokes, supra note 27, at 3252.
176. See Wirth, supra note 26, at 2645 (1991).
177. See id. at 2655-56.
178. Based on their success, EFL and NRDC have entered into a formal re-
lationship to examine in broad terms Sri Lanka's national energy needs and
policies, as well energy alternatives in the Third World generally. Id. at 2656.
179. There have been many successful examples of the partnership model.
A similar coalition, for example, was able to achieve passage of legislation re-
quiring U.S. representatives to the World Bank to seek greater participation by
NGOs in Bank activities. Stokes, supra note 27, at 3251.
180. "Ironically, American environmental organizations often have far
greater leverage than the real stakeholders, members of the public in develop-
ing countries. Wirth, supra note 26, at 2652.
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spective on local environmental problems, 181 and have an ap-
pearance of legitimacy when lobbying multinational
organizations. 182 The WTO should encourage such partner-
ships, since this indirect form of participation "is often a more
effective mechanism for developing country activists to achieve
their goals than dialogue with their own governments."183
IV. CONCLUSION
"While it appears that most nations recognize that
'[elnvironmental issues are best handled with the participation
of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level,' the law of inter-
national environmental protection does not yet recognize that,
increasingly, the relevant level is a global one." 184 NGOs can
provide a voice for citizens, who are otherwise excluded from
most international participation, and help to overcome the dif-
ferences between environmental and free trade advocates. Fur-
thermore, by allowing for NGO observation of WTO
deliberations, the problem of transparency will be overcome.
NGOs have proven their effectiveness in IGOs, particularly
with regard to the environment. Whether the WTO utilizes
some form of the U.N. three-tiered model for NGO participation,
or whether it adopts its own system, there are many ways in
which NGOs can make valuable contributions to the work of the
WTO. The creation of the WTO has ushered in a new era for
world trade in the twenty-first century. By taking advantage of
the new provision which allows for NGO participation, this new
era can be a green one.
181. "[Jludging the merits of a particular advocacy goal or strategy in its
own legal, social, political, and economic context requires the perspective pro-
vided by a foreign counterpart." Id. at 2659.
182. "A close relationship with those who hold a direct stake in policy deci-
sions gives the United States-based organization stature and credibility that it
would not have if it were representing purely American interests." Id.
183. Id. Moreover, NGO partnerships can significantly increase the eco-
nomic strength of developing countries both through improvements in effi-
ciency, and direct financial assistance. "Through improvements in efficiency
and conservation, developing countries could avoid at least $1.4 trillion in
power supply expansion costs between now and the year 2008." Id. at 2657.
Moreover, as of 1988, Western NGOs were donating more than $4.4 billion an-
nually to developing countries. Stokes, supra note 27, at 3251.
184. Rubinton, supra note 15, at 485 (citing Draft of Environmental Rules:
'Global Partnership', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992, at 10).
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